英國和美國的關系有多好?

Dan Bradbury
People need to understand the firm, unshifting schist upon which the alliance between the UK and the USA sits and why little short of culture-obliterating events could change that. There are likely no two nations on Earth (certainly, none of any relevant power) that compare to the closeness of the United States and the United Kingdom. The only other alliances that compare are —and with a overlapping culture and concerns— those between the two concerned in this answer and Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
But what about that history? The US and the UK have stood back to back in battle against enemies in the two greatest wars in human history. They share a common language and a quaint cultural enmity towards the other; the kind of faux abrasiveness one observes between close paternal cousins who jostle about and compare sexual prowess or athletic achievement. Every barb, every insult, every smug rejoinder confirms the unique closeness and unspoken love rather than an indicator of any actual enmity.
The Second World War cemented that. It hasn't changed since.

人們必須理解英國和美國聯(lián)盟所基于的堅實、不可動搖的基礎，以及為何除非發(fā)生文化滅絕級別的事件，否則這種聯(lián)盟不太可能改變。在地球上可能沒有兩個國家——當然沒有具有任何相關實力的國家——能夠與美國和英國之間的緊密程度相媲美。其他可以比較的聯(lián)盟只有加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭之間的聯(lián)盟，它們的文化和關注點都是重疊的。
然而，歷史上美國和英國在人類歷史上最大規(guī)模的兩場戰(zhàn)爭中并肩作戰(zhàn)，共同對抗敵人。他們共享同一種語言，并且彼此之間有一種奇特的文化敵對情緒；這類似于親密的堂兄弟之間那種表面上的摩擦，他們互相推搡，比較彼此的性能力或運動成就。每一次挑釁、每一次侮辱、每一次自滿的回擊，實際上都確認了他們之間獨特的親密無間和不言而喻的愛意，而不是真正的敵意。
第二次世界大戰(zhàn)加強了這種關系，自那以后，這一點從未改變。

Churchill was never loved in Parliament anything like he was by the public or the press; to his peers he was a necessary evil of focused anger and pinpoint aggressiveness to counter the Nazi threat. The First Lord of the Admiralty took far too much pleasure in beating the drums of war for those in Parliament. Even after Hitler invaded Poland, Lord Halifax was the preferred candidate. But Halifax never showed interest in it (nor was it in fashion for a Lord to assume the head of government). Churchill practically begged for it to the chagrin of his fellow parliamentarians, who saw such garish campaigning as positively American, and therefore gauche (and apropos, given Churchill's near ancestry).
Churchill's open contempt (indeed, hostility) for Chamberlain cost him politically, nearly to the point of ensuring he'd never be elevated. But as history demonstrated, there was no cost Churchill would not incur to achieve victory against the Nazis. Brutality, it was determined, should be countered by a type of brutality that only England could fashion and had repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to engineer on the rare occasions history called for it. Churchill was not Parliament's first choice, but events sexted the man more than Parliament and more than England

丘吉爾在議會中從未像公眾或媒體那樣受到廣泛愛戴；在他的同僚看來，他是對抗納粹威脅的必要之惡，集中憤怒和精確的侵略性來對抗納粹的威脅。海軍大臣對于為議會成員敲響戰(zhàn)爭的戰(zhàn)鼓表現(xiàn)得過于熱衷。即使在希特勒入侵波蘭之后，議會更傾向于哈利法克斯勛爵。但哈利法克斯從未表現(xiàn)出興趣（貴族擔任政府首腦也不合潮流）。丘吉爾幾乎是懇求得到這個職位，這讓他的議會同事們感到不快，因為他們覺得這種過于顯眼的競選手法非常具有美國風格，因而顯得不夠得體（而且，鑒于丘吉爾接近美國的血統(tǒng)，這看起來尤其恰當）。
丘吉爾對內(nèi)侍的公開蔑視（甚至敵意）在政治上讓他付出了代價，幾乎到了確保他永遠不會被提升的地步。但歷史表明，為了戰(zhàn)勝納粹，丘吉爾愿意付出任何代價。英國政府決定，應該用一種只有英國才能駕馭的殘暴來對抗這種殘暴，而且在歷史罕見的情況下，英國一再展示出駕馭這種殘暴的能力。丘吉爾本不是議會的首選，丘吉爾不是議會最初的人選，但是是時勢而非議會，更不是英格蘭本身，選擇了他。

The Empire won; the Germans, Italians and Japanese lost. It came at great cost.
At the conclusion of World War II, the British Empire was hocked to the Americans. As mentioned, there was nothing that Churchill --thus the Empire-- would not to do remain in the war and defeat the Nazis. But after the war, that was another story. The Lend-Lease Act put Great Britain into deep debt with the United States. In a parallel universe, the massive, crumbling Empire that the United Kingdom administered, with which she enjoyed a super-special trading agreement that lined her coffers (and made lazy her industries) would be able to pay back the debt within a generation. But the US pounded the final nail into the coffin of the Empire (and the French one to boot): the Atlantic Charter. To get money, both empires had to open the floodgates to American-style capitalism and competition.
In 1945, nothing could compete on the open market with American industry. Nothing could compete in numbers; nothing could compete in quality; nothing could compete in technology. The Atlantic Charter opened the doors of Europe to American cinema that quickly destroyed their local markets. Their stores were flooded with American fashion, TVs, radios, cars and everything in between. That wasn't to last either, but the point is, Britain's one and only way to remain a viable global power was its special relationship with the nations in the Commonwealth-Empire. After that ended, Britain had no choice but to fall into the arms of America.

帝國贏了；德國人、意大利人和日本人輸了，這是以巨大的代價換來的。
第二次世界大戰(zhàn)結束時，大英帝國欠了美國巨額債務。正如所提到的，為了繼續(xù)參戰(zhàn)并打敗納粹，沒有什么是丘吉爾——因此是帝國——不愿意做的。但戰(zhàn)爭結束后，情況就不同了?！蹲饨璺ò浮肥褂鴮γ绹搨劾?。在一個可能的平行世界中，英國曾經(jīng)管理著一個龐大但逐漸衰敗的帝國，并且通過一項特殊的貿(mào)易協(xié)定獲得巨大利益，這項協(xié)定不僅填滿了國庫，也讓它的相關產(chǎn)業(yè)變得缺乏競爭力。在那個世界里，英國本有能力在一代人的時間里償還所有債務。然而，美國通過大西洋憲章為英國（以及法國）的帝國敲響了終結的鐘聲。為了獲得資金支持，這兩個帝國不得不開放市場，接受美式資本主義和競爭的沖擊。
1945年，在公開市場上，沒有什么能與美國工業(yè)競爭。沒有什么能在數(shù)量上與之競爭;沒有什么能在質量上與之競爭;在技術方面，沒有什么能與之競爭。大西洋憲章為美國電影打開了歐洲的大門，這些電影很快摧毀了它們的本地市場。他們的商店里充斥著美國的時尚、電視、收音機、汽車和所有介于其中的商品。這也沒能持續(xù)多久，但關鍵是，英國保持全球強國地位的唯一途徑是它與英聯(lián)邦國家的特殊關系。戰(zhàn)爭結束后，英國別無選擇，只能投入美國的懷抱。

It wasn't that easy though. Until the Suez Canal incident, the Brits were under two delusions that quickly ended: that they could write checks (in any denomination) that Uncle Sam would happily cash and that Britain still had the mettle to meddle. It didn't. The propinquity (in perfidy, display, function and time) of the Suez Canal incident to uprisings in Hungary, gave the Soviets political cover to crush that nascent plea for freedom. And how could Europe or America protest!? Eisenhower was incredibly displeased and he showed that displeasure with the greatest threat possible: he threatened to destroy the Pound Sterling.
The Brits acquiesced. The invasion collapsed. The Israelis withdrew. The French (oh how they fumed) remade its entire military and foreign policy after that. A 20-year rift in relations between France and the UK ensued. The UK was offered a special deal on nuclear missiles. The French fumed. The US put nukes in Germany. The French fumed. The French counterpunched by keeping the UK out of the EEC until de Gaulle was dead. They remained allies, but it wasn't until Thatcher and Mitterrand that the breach was closed.

但這并不容易。直到蘇伊士運河事件之前，英國人還抱有兩個幻想，很快這些幻想就破滅了：他們可以開出任何面額的支票，山姆大叔都樂意兌現(xiàn)，而英國仍然有干預的勇氣。事實并非如此，蘇伊士運河事件的發(fā)生與匈牙利的起義在時間上非常接近，為蘇聯(lián)提供了政治上的掩護去壓制那剛剛興起的自由訴求。歐洲或美國又如何能夠提出抗議呢？艾森豪威爾極其不悅，并且用最嚴厲的手段表達了他的不滿：他威脅要摧毀英鎊的貨幣價值。
英國人默許了。入侵失敗了，以色列人撤退了。法國人（哦，他們多么憤怒）在那之后重新塑造了整個軍事和外交政策。英法之間隨之而來的是20年的關系裂痕。英國獲得了一項特殊協(xié)議，獲得了核導彈。法國人憤怒了。美國在德國部署了核武器。法國人憤怒了，作為反擊，法國將英國排除在歐洲經(jīng)濟共同體之外，直到戴高樂去世。他們?nèi)匀皇敲擞?，但直到撒切爾和密特朗時期，這一裂痕才得以彌合。

But Britain thought more pragmatically on the matter of its place and its relationship with America. Knowing that the UK would never again be a superpower, it was decided from that point on (i.e. post licking of Suez wounds), British foreign policy would be to (a) fashion a relationship of such cordiality between the US and the UK that when the needs of the UK arose, the US would want to acquiesce; (b) that Britain would never again act outside of Washington's expressed interest; and (c) that Britain would forever inform the US of all its policy initiatives.
It has largely worked. Britain, far from being the US's lackey, has fashioned itself into the only tail in history with the potential to wag the whole goddamned dog. And while there are still festering wounds from Iraq, the fact remains that the US never pushed the UK to act and Blair --no one's pushover-- happened to believe both in the mission and British committment to the alliance with the US.

但英國在考慮自己的地位和與美國的關系時更加務實。明白英國不再擁有超級大國地位，自那以后（也就是蘇伊士運河的傷痛平復之后），英國的外交策略便重新定位：(a) 與美國建立一種親切友好的關系，確保在關鍵時刻能夠得到美國的支持；(b) 英國的行動將不再違背華盛頓所明確表達的利益；(c) 英國將始終向美國通報其所有政策動向。
這一策略在很大程度上取得了成功。英國并沒有淪為美國的傀儡，已經(jīng)將自己塑造成了歷史上唯一有潛力顛覆整個大局的“小卒”。盡管伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭造成的創(chuàng)傷仍在，但實際情況是，美國從未強迫英國采取行動，而布萊爾——他不是輕易屈服的人——恰好既認同這一使命，也堅信英國對與美國聯(lián)盟的承諾。

But the alliance remains strong, despite (well deserved) upset by the British people (and far too little on behalf of the American people). The US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the only multiple nations that share their entire intelligence network, indeed, to the point where there is absolutely no distinction between where the technical ownership of one begins and the other ends.
Post 9/11, the US and UK (+3) are the two closest allies on the planet. That there are differing perspectives and mutual annoyances (Bush and Blair were further apart politically but closer than can be understood; Obama and Cameron are nearly identical politically speaking, yet are known to not share any friendship), is of little concern. Expect the relationship to continue that way for the remainder of our lives.

但是，盡管英國人民(以及美國人民的呼聲太少)感到不安(這是理所應當?shù)?，美英同盟依然堅固。美國、英國、加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭是唯一共享整個情報網(wǎng)絡的多個國家，事實上，這些國家的技術所有權從哪里開始，從哪里結束，絕對沒有區(qū)別。
9/11之后，美國和英國(+3)是這個星球上最親密的兩個盟友。有不同的觀點和共同的煩惱(布什和布萊爾在政治上的分歧更大，但卻比人們所能理解的更近;奧巴馬和卡梅倫在政治上幾乎是一模一樣的，但眾所周知他們沒有任何友誼)，這沒什么可擔心的。期待這種關系在我們的余生中繼續(xù)下去。

Edwyn Nicholson
What are some good things in the relationship between the US and the UK? I know there's a lot of hate on Quora but let's talk about positives.
The UK and US have much in common.
Important Defence Allies
Important Intelligence Allies
Important Trade Partners
Shared Political Ideology (Capitalist Democracy)
Shared Culture (Film, Music, Television, Literature, etc)
Shared Language
Shared History

美國和英國之間關系中的一些積極方面是什么？我知道在Quora上有很多仇恨言論，但我們來談談積極的方面。
英國和美國有許多共同點：
重要的國防盟友
重要的情報盟友
重要的貿(mào)易伙伴
共享的政治理念（資本主義民主）
共享的文化（電影、音樂、電視、文學等）
共享的語言
共享的歷史
原創(chuàng)翻譯：龍騰網(wǎng) http://www.top-shui.cn 轉載請注明出處

Trevor
How close are the US and the UK?
Well the fact that most Americans will tell you they'd die for their UK brothers and sisters speaks volumes and believe it or not (regardless of the anti American stereotypes) the UK would die for Americans as well and we have both done this for eachother
The only other national anthem that has ever played at Buckingham palace from another country was the star spangled banner, as a way to show their support during the tragedy of 9/11. I mean that speaks for itself.
Top it off with the fact that America shares all if not most of it's top secret military secrets with UK, because of the deep trust they have. Hence why so many bases are based in UK. If anything happened to UK Americans would be right there already.
People say we are divided by a commom language but that has two sides. In essence America is born out of the blood of the English and though language is vastly different for a shared language, it's also what helps tie us closer together.

美國和英國有多親近？
事實上，大多數(shù)美國人會告訴你，他們會為他們的英國兄弟姐妹犧牲，這本身就說明了很多事情。不管你信不信（不管反美的刻板印象如何），英國也會為美國人犧牲，我們彼此都這么做過。
在白金漢宮，除了英國國歌之外，唯一演奏過的外國國歌是美國的《星條旗》，這是在9/11悲劇期間表達他們支持的方式。我的意思是，這一點本身就很能說明問題。
再加上美國與英國分享幾乎所有的頂級軍事機密，因為他們之間有深厚的信任。這就是為什么那么多美國基地被設在英國。如果英國出了什么事，美國人已經(jīng)在那里了。
人們說我們被一種共同的語言所分隔，但這種說法有兩面性。本質上，美國是誕生于英國人的血液，盡管語言有很大的不同，但它也是幫助我們更加緊密聯(lián)系在一起的因素。

In the end you have two countries with deep history, close economic and cultural ties, a deep seeded bond, and similar goals, politics, environmental stances, and religious ideology
All of this earned the unique title of “special relationship" which is unparalleled throughout the world and history. When one falls the other picks them up or falls trying. All this born out of such horrific history between the two countries is nothing short of miraculous.
I could go on but in the end, if citizens from either country bad mouth the other, they clearly need a reality check because as far as friends go we are the best for eachother that one can get

最終，你們是兩個有著深厚歷史、緊密的經(jīng)濟和文化聯(lián)系、根深蒂固的紐帶、以及相似的目標、政治、環(huán)境立場和宗教理念的國家。
所有這些都贏得了“特殊關系”這一獨特的稱號，這在全世界和歷史上都是無與倫比的。當一方跌倒時，另一個會扶起它，或者嘗試著跌倒。這一切都源于兩國之間如此可怕的歷史，這簡直是奇跡。
我可以繼續(xù)說下去，但歸根結底，如果來自任何一個國家的公民詆毀對方，他們顯然需要現(xiàn)實檢查，因為就朋友而言，我們是彼此能得到的最好的朋友。

Muhammad Zaman
Let’s put it this way:
The tone of the relationship is set by the incoming US President, never our PM. The former’s actions are proactive, the latter’s reactionary. For example Obama was more amenable than Trump, and Trump less dismissive than Biden, while our PM’s are uniformly obsequious to all of them
While the UK has a professional and effective military, we are still hugely dependent on the US, as the setting of the evacuation deadline in Kabul by the US, not by allies make clear. Nor would have the UK or other allies would have gone into Bosnia, Syria or Iraq without US involvement.

讓我們這樣看問題：
美國與英國關系的基調(diào)通常由新上任的美國總統(tǒng)來設定，而不是我們的首相來設定。美國總統(tǒng)的行動往往具有主動性，而我們的首相則更多是被動反應。例如，奧巴馬比特朗普更易于溝通，拜登又比特朗普更輕視人一點，而我們的首相對所有美國總統(tǒng)都表現(xiàn)得過分順從。
雖然英國擁有專業(yè)且高效的軍事力量，但我們在很大程度上仍然依賴于美國，正如在喀布爾設定的撤離最后期限是由美國單方面決定的，而不是與盟友協(xié)商的結果一樣。如果沒有美國的參與，英國或其他盟友也不會介入波斯尼亞、敘利亞或伊拉克的事務。

The US has a economy about eight times bigger than ours. If anything we had more economic clout with the Americans when we were also part of the EU, but not post-Brexit. The US can seek demands and assurances from our PM regarding our Irish border, but no one can dictate the Americans about their own borders. The current COVID ban of UK travellers to the US, but not vice versa is another clear reinforcement of that fact.
The common cultural and language and historical arguments are suspect too, given that there are closer ties to Canada, Oz and NZ but no “special relationship.”
The special relationship exists primarily in the minds of those UK politicians and individuals wishing greater prestige by association with a superpower than we actually have in reality without that association. From the American side, the premise is based on cultural and historical affinity, not political or economic reality.

美國的經(jīng)濟規(guī)模大約是我們的八倍。如果說我們曾經(jīng)擁有更多的經(jīng)濟影響力，那也是在我們還是歐盟的一部分時，但脫歐后情況已不再如此。美國可以就愛爾蘭邊境問題向我們的總理尋求要求和保證，但沒有人能夠對美國自己的邊境政策指手畫腳。當前，美國對英國旅行者實施COVID禁令，但英國卻不能對美國旅行者采取對等措施，這清楚地強化了美國在這一關系中的主導地位。
關于共同的文化、語言和歷史聯(lián)系的論點也存在疑問，畢竟我們與加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭有著更緊密的聯(lián)系，但卻并未形成所謂的“特殊關系”。
所謂的“特殊關系”主要存在于那些希望借助與超級大國的聯(lián)系來提升自身聲望的英國政治家和個人的想象中，這并非基于我們實際擁有的影響力。從美國的角度來看，這種關系更多是基于文化和歷史的親近，而非政治或經(jīng)濟的現(xiàn)實考量。